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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Torts-Libel and Slander-Extemporaneous Defamatory Remarks
Over Television
In Shor v. Billingsley' the defendant made extemporaneous defamatory statements on a television program. Plaintiff pleaded three causes
of action for defamation. All alleged the statements were false and
uttered for the express purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his business.
The first cause of action presented the principal problem in the case:
Whether extemporaneous defamatory words in a telecast constitute
libel or slander. 2 The defendants argued that no cause of action was
stated3 because there was no permanent physical form present in an extemporaneous telecast 4 and that the application of the law of libel to
broadcasting or telecasting without a script must be made (if at all)
by the legislature rather than by the courts. 5 The court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss for insufficiency and held that the defamatory telecast would be treated as libel. Thus, no special damages
need be alleged.
The civil action of libel was first announced in 1670 by Lord Chief
Baron Hale in King v. Lake 6 in the Exchequer. 7 A distinction was
drawn between the old civil action for slander and the new tort of libel on
the basis of permanence or nonpermanence of form. Written defamation, being of more permanent duration, was considered the more harmThe majority of these states, however, allow the legislature to waive this immunity. Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1363 (1954).
'4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
' The second cause of action alleged that the statements were read from a
prepared script or notes. The court held this to be libel and relied on Hartmann
v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947).
The third cause of action
alleged that a motion picture was made of the telecast which was later exhibited.
This, the court held, was also libel, citing Brown v. Paramount-Publix Corp.,
240 App. Div. 520, 270 N.Y. Supp. 544 (3d Dep't 1934), and Ostrowe v. Lee,
296 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931). A fourth cause of action was for invasion
of privacy and was considered separately by the court.
'The defendants apparently contended that if there was an action it was in
slander and that the remarks were not slanderous per se. Therefore, it was contended, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for failure to allege special
damages.
"To support this propositon the defendants cited the words of Chief Justice
Cardozo in Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931): "The
schism in the law of defamation between the older wrong of slander and the newer
one of libel is not the product of mere accident. . . . It has its genesis in evils
which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said
with impunity through the medium of speech. No so, however, when speech is
caught upon the wing and transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the
writing is its permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written
one abides and 'perpetuates the scandal.'"
(Emphasis added.)
' Such legislation has been enacted in England. Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16
Go. 6 & 1 ELIZ. 2, c. 66; see Note, 66 HARv. L. REV. 476 (1953).
'Hardres 470, Skinner 124 (1670).
" Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L.
REv. 546, 569-70 (1903).
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ful and was labeled libel. The lesser tort of oral defamation remained
the tort of slander, it being of temporary duration and thus less harmful.
Libel was held to be a wrongful act per se, damage being presumed.,
The permanence of form test was followed in the common law courts
and was finally settled in 1812 by Lord Mansfield in Thorley v. Lord
Kerry,9 on the ground that though indefensible in principle, the distinction was too well established to be repudiated.10
The customary distinctions between libel and slander were readily
adapted to new conditions with relatively little difficulty until the courts
2
were confronted with defamation through radio" and television.1
Initially the problem was resolved within the traditional bounds of defamation, since the earlier cases involved reading from a prepared script
and the courts could draw an analogy to the reading aloud of a defamatory writing, which has long been considered libelous. 13
The courts encountered their greatest difficulty in cases where the
words broadcast were extemporaneous. The law in this area remains
in a state of flux, and three views have evolved.
Locke v. Gibbons14 represents one view. There the court reasoned
that not only should the potentiality for harm be considered, but the
element of permanence of form as well. The court likened a radio broadcaster's extemporaneous speech to a speech delivered over an amplifier to
a vast audience in a stadium and concluded that both involve the spoken
word and that both are slanderous.
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.' 5 announced a
second view. The court concluded that defamation by radio was a new
tort with rules of its own, since it did not fall within the traditional rules
of libel or slander. The court failed to indicate what the rules for the
new tort would be and decided the case on the question of negligence in
leasing the transmitting facilities.
A third view, long advocated by legal writers on the subject, 16 was
17
given substance in a concurring opinion in Hartmann v. Winchell.
' For a discussion of the history of defamation, see Veeder, The History and
Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 546 (1903).
See also
PROSSER, TORTS C. 19 (2d ed. 1955); Barry, Radio, Television and the Law of
Defamation, 23 AusR. L.J. 203 (1949); PLUCKNETr, A CoxcisE HISTORY o TIHE
Commox LAw 454 (4th ed. 1948); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Tim HISTORY 0
ENGLISH LAW 536-38 (2d ed. 1898) ; Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1956).

'4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
10 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 568, comment b (1938).
"Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed per
ceuriam, KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933).
" Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
"Forrester v. Tyrrell, 9 T.L.R. 258 (1893).
" 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd menr., 253 App.
Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938).
15366 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
16 PROSSER, TORTS § 93, p. 595 (2d ed. 1955).

"296 N.Y. 296, 300, 73 N.E.2d 30, 32 (1947)

(concurring opinion).
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There Justice Fuld argued that the primary reason for broader liability
for libel than slander has been the greater capacity for harm that a
writing is assumed to have because of its wide range of dissemination
consequent upon its permanence of form; that the audience of radio is
often greater than that of the nation's largest newspapers; that the fact
that defamation by radio in the absence of a script or transcription lacks
the measure of durability possessed by libel in no way lessens its capacity
for harm; that the element of damage is historically the basis for a
common law action for defamation; and that it is as reasonable to
presume damage from the nature of the medium employed when defamation is broadcast by radio as when published by writing. On these
grounds Justice Fuld concluded that both logic and policy point to the
result that defamation by radio is actionable per se.' 8
In the principal case the court, in disposing of the defendants' contention that no cause of action was stated because there was no permanence of form in an extemporaneous telecast, concluded that Locke
v. Gibbons was not controlling because of circumstances, indicating that
the lower court's dismissal in that case was affirmed on the ground that
the words complained of were not set forth in the complaint ;19 adopted
the reasoning of the concurring opinion in the Hartmann case ;20 cited
the work of legal writers in support of that reasoning ;21 and regarded the
language of Chief Justice Cardozo in Ostrowe v. Lee22 as not precluding recovery since the court there was not restricting the law of libel,
but extending it. The "permanence of form," the court said, was not
historically a prerequisite to libel, but was one factor which justified an
23
extension of liability.
In rejecting the defendants' argument that the application of the law
of libel to extemporaneous broadcasting must be made by the legislature,
the court observed that it is the duty of the courts to extend an established rule of law to new technological developments. 24 The court
pointed out that a case of first impression does not always present a
problem for the legislature nor does it follow that there is no remedy
for a wrong done, "because every form of action, when brought for
'25
the first time, must have been without a precedent to support it."
Furthermore, said the court, "We act in the finest common-law tradition
21Id. at 304, 73 N.E.2d at 34.
158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 480 (Sup. Ct.
0 Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 860,
1956).

at 861, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 480-81.
Id. at 861-63, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 481-83.

20Id.
21

See note 4 supra.
Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 864, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 484 (Sup. Ct.

22 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931).
2

1956).
2

' Ibid.

" Id. at 866, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 486, quoting from Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y.

176, 178, 44 N.E. 773, 774 (1896).
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when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense jus26

fice."

The court cast aside the ancient technical distinctions between libel
and slander based upon permanence of form and based its decision on
the capacity for harm. In so doing, the court has taken a great stride
forward in adapting the common law to the changing nature of human
affairs.
MAX D. BALLINGER
,Torts--Res Ipsa Loquitur-Malpractice Cases
The plaintiff's arm was fractured during electro-shock treatment administered by the defendant psychiatrist. His suit for damages was on
two different theories: breach of warranty and negligence. Defendant
psychiatrist moved for summary judgment. The court in Johnston v.
Rodis1 granted the motion.
The court disposed of the breach of warranty theory by saying, "An
expression of opinion on the part of a physician that a particular course
of treatment is safe, does not constitute a warranty . . . . [H]e is
answerable only for negligence."

'2

The negligence theory also failed as the court also held that no specific negligence was charged and that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
In order to have the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, the plaintiff
must show the existence of three conditions. 3 The accident or injury
must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence, 4 there must be a reasonable inference that the
6
defendant is responsible for the negligence which caused the injury,
and it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the plaintiff.6 The malpractice cases in which plaintiffs
-"Ibid., quoting from Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691,
694 (1951).
1151 F. Supp. 345 (D.C. 1957), rev'd, -F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1958). The court
reversed on the warranty theory but upheld the district court on the negligence
and agreed that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
theory
2
Id. at 348.
'PRossER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
' Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E2d 242 (1941) (res ipsa loquitur
applied where gauze sponge was left buried in plaintiff's hip).
"The control at one time or another of one or more of the various agencies
or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of
every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This we think places
on them the burden of initial explanation." Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486,
492, 154 P.2d 690 (1944) (non-suit reversed); Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949) (on re-trial judgment for plaintiff against all
defendants affirmed, defendants offered no explanation of injury). See also Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935) (gauze sponge left in
abdominal cavity following Caesarean section); PROSsER, ToRTs § 42 (2d ed.
1955).
" Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 286, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (injury while patient
was unconscious).

